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ABSTRACT 
 This project defines specific program manager (PM) responsibilities, PM 
authorities, and acquisition stakeholder authorities based on Department of Defense 
(DoD) acquisition policies and Army regulations. It maps PM processes, revealing the 
conflicts and issues with existing definitions, and identifies opportunities to improve the 
Army acquisition process. Selected primary documentation of DoD and Army 
regulations, DoD and Army directives, specific program acquisition documentation, 
supplemental data from other federal organizations, and published research are used to 
identify the organizational structure, responsibilities, authorities, and acquisition 
processes of the U.S. Army. The analysis determines how the mission aligns or conflicts 
with the specific authorities prescribed throughout Army policies and regulations. 
Furthermore, the analysis uses IDEF0 function modeling to outline the process 
mechanisms that serve to enforce alignment or, conversely, to promote conflict between 
the PM’s mission and authority, and acquisition stakeholder authority. 
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On 22 April 2015, the Honorable Heidi Shyu, serving then as the Army Acquisition 
Executive (AAE), presented a chart titled “Acquisition Accountability Bus” to the Senate 
Armed Services Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee. She explained that 
within Army acquisition, the Program Manager (PM) is the bus driver. However, instead 
of being the only one in control of the bus, every one of the passengers (stakeholders) have 
their own steering wheel and brake. With so many “drivers” on board, what inevitably 
happens to the bus—to the Army program—is that it veers off course and “flips over,” 
Shyu said (Vergun, 2015, para. 7). The point of Shyu’s analogy, as illustrated in Figure 1, 
is that while Army PMs are responsible for the full life cycle of their programs, there are 
many other stakeholders who have been given the authority (by law or regulation) to alter 
a PM’s decisions regardless of the negative impact it may cause.  
 
Figure 1. AAE Briefing Slide to the Senate Armed Services Committee. 
Source: Shyu (2015). 
2 
Shyu believed the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition system often puts 
Army Program Managers (PMs) at a disadvantage in accomplishing their task of bringing 
materiel solutions to the warfighter. However, it is not clear what mechanisms for exerting 
authority or influence (the steering wheel and the brakes) are being utilized by external 
stakeholders in the manner described by Shyu. Do these external influences leverage that 
influence or authority because of explicit language in DoD or Army policies and 
regulations? The most direct way to answer that question is to exhaustively review those 
very policies and regulations to determine what authorities and responsibilities are 
specifically prescribed to the PM and the external stakeholders of their mission. We further 
explore this concept by answering the following questions. 
• Can a systems engineering approach be used to objectively research, 
identify, and model the explicit authorities and responsibilities of an Army 
PM based on the major policy and regulation documents? 
• How do the regulations and policies of the acquisition process direct or 
prescribe specific PM authorities and responsibilities? 
• Where does that differ from the directed, implied or derivative authorities 
that other external stakeholders have?  
A. PURPOSE 
This project defines specific Program Manager (PM) responsibilities, PM 
authorities, and stakeholder authorities based on existing DoD acquisition policies and 
Army regulations. It maps PM processes, revealing any conflicts or potential issues with 
existing definitions and identifies opportunities to improve the Army acquisition process. 
An analysis of Army acquisition policies and regulations serves as the starting point for 
understanding the explicit responsibilities of the Army PM, primarily outlined in DoD 
Instruction 5000.02.  
The analysis determines how the mission may align or conflict with the specific 
authorities prescribed throughout other Army policies and regulations. Furthermore, the 
analysis outlines the process mechanisms that serve to enforce alignment or, conversely, 
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to promote conflict between the PM’s mandated mission and authority. The analysis also 
examines the external stakeholders’ authority as explicitly stated in Army policies and 
regulations. Finally, it is also anticipated that the data and analysis framework will be a 
bridge to future comparable study within the acquisition process of the other Services or a 
comparable study of proposed acquisition reforms. 
B. SCOPE 
A review of the literature included selected primary documentation of DoD and 
Army regulations, DoD and Army directives, specific program acquisition documentation, 
supplemental data from other federal organizations, and published research to identify the 
organizational structure, responsibilities, authorities, and acquisition processes of the U.S. 
Army. 
In order to ensure that the scope of this effort was achievable, it was important that 
we focus on those documents that are most fundamental to the Army acquisition process. 
As a first step, we chose not to research Air Force—or Navy—specific policy. We 
reviewed and analyzed the following non-Army specific documents in order to establish 
the higher framework in which the Army regulations fit: 
1. Chairman of The Joint Chiefs Of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01I - 
Joint Capabilities Integration And Development System (JCIDS) and its 
corresponding operation manual 
2. DoD Directive 5000.01, with focus on its instruction, DoD Instruction 
(DoDI) 5000.02 
3. Financial Management Regulation (FMR) 7000.14R 
The DoD Acquisition Process, also known as the “Big ‘A’ - Acquisition” process, 
illustrated in Figure 2, has three primary processes and stakeholders. The JCIDS is a 
process executed by the capability developer and the primary document is CJCSI 3170.01I. 
This process provides the requirement. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting and 
Execution Process (PPBE) is executed by the Comptroller and its primary document is the 
FMR. This process provides the funding. The Defense Acquisition System (DAS) is the 
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process executed by the materiel developer (commonly assumed to ultimately be the PM) 
and the primary controlling document is the DoDI 5000.02. This process provides program 
and acquisition direction.  
 
Figure 2. Big “A” Acquisition Process. Source: Defense Acquisition 
University (n.d.). 
The Army publication website, https://armypubs.army.mil/, contains over 529 
active regulations, directives, and pamphlets. Within this set, more than 80 documents 
include at least some usage of the term “program manager.” Initial project work collected 
information from 38 of these documents, and it became clear that an appropriately thorough 
analysis of all 80 was not achievable, or necessarily required, to develop an effective 
understanding of the Army acquisition process. We selected the following ten Army 
documents: 
1. Army Regulation 1–1 (AR 1–1), Planning, Programming, Budgeting, And 
Execution System 
2. Army Pamphlet 10 -1 (PAM 10–1), Organization of the United States 
Army 
3. AR 10–87, Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, And 
Direct Reporting Units 
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4. AR 70–1, Army Acquisition Policy 
5. AR 73–1, Test and Evaluation Policy 
6. PAM 73–1, Test and Evaluation in Support of Systems Acquisition 
7. AR 700–8, Logistics Planning Factors and Data Management 
8. AR 700–127, Integrated Product Support 
9. AR 700–142, Type Classification, Materiel Release, Fielding, And 
Transfer 
10. AR 702–19; Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability 
Selection of these ten documents was determined by the likelihood that each would 
provide insight into one or more of the primary processes of a program—requirement, 
funding and direction. With selection of AR 1–1, we anticipated gaining insight into 
funding. PAM 10–1 and AR 10–87 were expected to identify key sources of program and 
acquisition direction, with AR 70–1, AR 73–1 and 700–127 providing the actual process 
direction. AR 700–8, AR-700-142 and AR 702–19 were selected to provide more specific 
direction for achieving the goal of Army acquisition which is to supply materiel and 
services to our Soldiers so that they can accomplish their mission. A newly approved 
version of AR 70–1 (16 June 2017) was added to the project to determine similarity and 
contrast to the previous AR 70–1. These changes may also demonstrate acquisition policy 
changes that support or counter our hypothesis. 
Documents that we did not research in detail were largely excluded because of one 
or more of the following reasons: 
1. Overly specific to a subset of products and/or customers (example, AR 1–
75 Administrative and Logistical Support of Overseas Security Assistance 
Organizations) 
2. Overly specific to implementation (example, PAM 5–20 Competitive 
Sourcing Implementation Instructions) 
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3. Addressed a single narrow aspect of program management (example, AR 
70–31 Standards for Technical Reporting) 
4. Primarily the responsibility of another Army function (example, 
capabilities developer, AR 71–19 Warfighting Capabilities Determination) 
Analysis of the data conducted during the literature review included the 
identification of potential conflicts within DoD and Army policy or regulations, and an 
exploration of the constraints imposed on PM functions. The analysis of constraints was 
further focused on those constraints originating from external stakeholders. 
C. RESEARCH CHALLENGE 
The Project Management Institute was established in 1969 as a nonprofit 
organization and leads the project management industry by providing certifications, global 
standards, an industry community, training and education, thought leadership and 
academic research (https://www.pmi.org/about/learn-about-pmi). PMI’s Guide to the 
Project Management Body of Knowledge states that “a common vocabulary is an essential 
element of a professional discipline” (Project Management Institute, 2017, p. 3). 
At the start of this effort, we believed this same assumption that the term “Program 
Manager” would be defined and used consistently among DoD and Army documents. 
Unfortunately, this immediately proved to be incorrect. Terminology used by the Army is 
both inconsistent with PMI’s standard and uses multiple variations from document to 
document and sometimes even with the same document. 
Since 2012, PMI has published a PMI Lexicon of Project Management Terms and 
in this document, they define the terms portfolio, portfolio manager, program, program 
manager, project and project manager. 
Portfolio Projects, programs, subsidiary portfolios, and operations 
managed as a group to achieve strategic objectives. See also 
program and project. 
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Portfolio Manager  The person or group assigned by the performing 
organization to establish, balance, monitor, and control 
portfolio components in order to achieve strategic business 
objectives. See also program manager and project manager. 
 
Program Related projects, subsidiary programs, and program 
activities managed in a coordinated manner to obtain 
benefits not available from managing them individually. See 
also program and project. 
 
Program Manager The person authorized by the performing organization to 
lead the team or teams responsible for achieving program 
objectives. See also portfolio manager and project manager. 
 
Project  A temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique 
product, service, or result. See also program and project. 
 
Project Manager  The person assigned by the performing organization to lead 
the team that is responsible for achieving the project 
objectives. See also portfolio manager and program 
manager. (Project Management Institute, 2017, pp. 7–9) 
 
When reviewing PMI’s definitions, it is clear that the hierarchy is downward from 
the portfolio/portfolio manager, then to the program/program manager and ends with the 
project/project manager at the lowest level. The definition of a portfolio manager is very 
consistent with that of a Program Executive Officer (PEO) since PEOs are typically 
assigned responsibility of a single large and complex project (such as the U.S. Air Force’s 
PEO Joint Strike Fighter) or a group of related programs (such as U.S. Army’s PEO 
Ammunition) that are to be managed to achieve a strategic objective. Based on our analysis, 
the DoD uses program manager in DoD 5000.02 in a manner that is consistent with PMI’s 
definition with 361 uses of the term and only five individual uses of similar words 
(acquisition manager, PM, PMO, and materiel developer). DoD 5000.02 does not use 
project manager and, in fact, only uses the word project three times. 
Unfortunately, Army usage of terms diverges from PMI significantly. This is seen 
within AR 70–1, where we find the following definitions: 
Program, project, or product manager—An HQDA CSL manager for a 
system or program. A PM may be subordinate to the AAE, PEO, or DRPM. 
Refers to the management level of intensity the Army assigns to a particular 
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weapon system or IS. As a general rule, a program manager is a GO or SES 
member; a project manager is an O–6, a GS–15, or the broadband or pay 
band equivalent; a product manager is an O–5, a GS–14, or the broadband 
or pay band equivalent. 
Project or Product Director – An ASA (ALT)/AAE centralized selection 
board manager, generally for an acquisition program of record that has yet 
to transition to sustainment and still has cost, schedule, and performance 
responsibilities. As a general rule, a project director is an O–6, a GS–15, or 
the broadband/pay band equivalent and may be subordinate to a PEO or 
DRPM; a PD is an O–5, a GS–14, or the broadband/pay band equivalent 
and may be subordinate to a PEO, project manager, or project director 
(Department of the Army, 2017, p. 52). 
The Army associates their highest level, GO or SES members, as program 
managers rather than PEOs/portfolio managers, the next level, O-6, as project managers 
and adds three additional layers for project directors, product managers and product 
directors. This adds more complexity and additional layers of bureaucracy to the 
acquisition process and results in more ambiguity regarding the roles, authorities and 
responsibilities of each level. For the purposes of this paper, we treated all levels below the 
PEO as synonymous with program manager.  
As we conducted our searches of DoD, and especially Army documents, we found 
additional terms used as synonyms for “Program Manager.” We identified at least 16 
different variations that we believe are synonymous, for the purposes of this effort, with 
the term “Program Manager.” This proved to be a major research challenge for this project. 
Unique to the JCIDs documents that were reviewed was the term “Solution 
Sponsor” and multiple documents used a variation of “Materiel Developer”: “MATDEV”; 
“material development organization,” “materiel developing agencies.” An example of 
inconsistent usage is when AR 70–1 states that “Army PMs have overall responsibility and 
accountability for their systems over the entire life cycle” (Department of the Army, 2017, 
p. 23). On the same page, AR 70–1 states that “Army MATDEVs will establish an 
integrated product support program and fully address system life cycle product support” 
(p. 23). 
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The more generic terms “acquisition manager” and “activity manager” were 
sometimes also used. An example is when an earlier version of AR 70–1 states that “all 
Army acquisition managers will establish an environmental management process” 
(Department of the Army, 2011, p. 14). 
Given that these examples treated these terms as synonyms, we expanded our 
search criteria to include all the derivations we found. The inconsistent use of terminology 
among acquisition regulations and instructions is an important finding on its own. It made 
analysis very challenging and certainly must have the same effect on the interpretation and 
implementation of these regulations, policies, and instructions.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
The primary objective of this research is to study and define the roles and 
responsibilities of an Army PM. This includes their acquisition documentation 
responsibilities, reporting responsibilities, stakeholder information responsibilities, and 
any other explicitly stated work they must perform as outlined in DoD Acquisition policies 
(5000.01 and 5000.02) and other major applicable regulations.  
In Engineering the Business of Defense Acquisition: An Analysis of Program Office 
Processes, Pickar and Jones (2014) have outlined an IDEF0 model framework for future 
research and analysis of the overall processes within a Program Management Office 
(PMO). This research aims to develop an objective method to catalog and analyze the 
explicit tasks prescribed to the PM across a wide range of policies and regulations. This 
data set provides work inputs to the Army PM and a model of Program Office processes 
initially defined by Pickar and Jones. 
A secondary objective is to identify, within and across different policies and 
regulations, any conflicts in the prescribed responsibilities and authorities of the PM. 
Additionally, this research captures any external stakeholder dependencies, time or 
resource constraints, and potential outputs to further inform the Pickar and Jones model of 
Program Office Processes. 
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The model developed provides a framework for follow-on study or expansion of 
the research into other branches. The analysis also provides reference material for possible 
future study and acquisition reform. We examined the 13 key documents (three non-Army 
and 10 ARs) and identified work elements that were required of the PM. The process was 
as follows: 
• Define the Search Terms for “Program Manager”  
• Search Source Documents for Explicit PM Roles and Responsibilities 
(Work Elements) 
• Introduce and Define Application of the IDEF0 Framework 
• Map the Acq. Process from a PM Perspective to Work Elements of IFEF0 
Framework 
• Analysis of IDEF0 Models and Observations (Chapter II)  
• Analysis of PM Work Elements Data (Chapter II) 
1. Define the Search Terms for Program Manager  
The data collection was initiated with a search of keywords to identify PM 
responsibilities and authorities as identified in each document. This keyword search began 
with “program,” “project,” “product,” “acquisition” and “manager.” In order to overcome 
our research challenges, it was necessary to expand the search to include additional search 
terms to identify synonyms to “Program Manager” and any corresponding acronyms or 
common abbreviations. These included “solution sponsor,” “resource sponsor,” 
“acquisition manager,” “PM,” “Program Manager,” “Product Manager,” “Project 
Manager,” “Program Management Office,” “PMO,” “Materiel Developer,” “MATDEV,” 
“materiel development organization,” “materiel developing agencies,” “Activity 
Manager.” Table 1 identifies a subset of the data showing the usage of these terms across 
different documents. We identified at least 16 different variations within the literature that 
we believe are synonymous for “Program Manager” in regard to how they impact roles and 
responsibilities of an Army PM.  
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A database was created to capture the data extracted from each document. The 
initial data capture included the page number, paragraph number, quoted paragraph text, 
and comments that identify specific items with significantly positive or negative value to 
defining program manager responsibilities or authorities. 
Table 1. Synonyms for PM by Source Document 
 
2. Search Source Documents and Identify Explicit PM Functions (Work 
Elements) 
Each source document was scrubbed against all of our defined search terms. Each 
match was then reviewed to determine if a specific role or responsibility was prescribed to 
the PM. If so, then other contextual and meta-data was captured to help classify the role or 
responsibility. 
The resulting data set from the 13 source documents, a sample of which is shown 
in Table 2, shows that we identified 82 work elements and the 931 times those elements 
showed up across all of the documents. The full data set, available in Appendix A, also 
shows how we later mapped each work element to a corresponding IDEF node. 
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Table 2. Work Element Data by Source Document 
 
3. Define IDEF0 Framework and Apply to Data Set 
IDEF0 is a function modeling method that originated from work funded by the 
United States Air Force to improve the efficiency of manufacturing processes using 
computers. IDEF stands for Icam DEFinition, and ICAM in turn stands for Integrated 
Computer Aided Manufacturing. IDEF0 was formally defined by the Federal Information 
Processing Standards Publication 183 (FIPS 183) but this standard was withdrawn in 
September 2008 and the method is open and no longer maintained (IDEF0, n.d.). 
Knowledge Based Systems, Inc. (KBSI) sells software based on the IDEF methods, 
including IDEF0, and they provide the original FIPS 183 document as well as other general 
information on the website, www.idef.com. 
IDEF0 is a useful tool for this effort because it enables the deconstruction of a 
complex system into manageable functions that can be more effectively analyzed and 
communicated. Furthermore, “the graphical elements of IDEF0 are very simple—just 
boxes and arrows” (Feldmann, 1998, p. 2). 
Figure 3 shows the basic IDEF methodology. The function name in each box is 
stated as a verb with descriptive nouns to make the name as informative as necessary, such 
as “Write Acquisition Strategy.” Arrows point into the left of the box to convey “Inputs” 
to the function and arrows pointing out of the right side to convey the function’s “Outputs.” 
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Arrows pointing down into the box are “Controls” on the function that limit or constrain 
the function such as specific laws or regulations. Arrows pointing up and into the box are 
“Mechanism” representing the “means” for completing the function. These mechanisms 
are often personnel or defined business processes.  
 
Figure 3. IDEF Methodology. Source: Pickar and Jones (2014). 
Pickar and Jones (2014) propose a more descriptive model specific to program 
management, as shown in Figure 4, that replaces “Function” with “Work,” and “Inputs” 
defined as “Requests for Information / Decision.” The “Output” i represented as a 




Figure 4. IDEF Applied to the PMO. Source: Pickar and Jones (2014). 
Generating an IDEF0 model requires data collection that is often accomplished 
through direct observation of the process or interviews. However, since the scope of this 
effort defines specific Program Manager (PM) responsibilities, PM authorities, and 
stakeholder authorities based on existing DoD acquisition policies and Army regulations 
the data collection was limited to the source documents as researched and understood by 
the authors.  
4. Map the Acquisition Process from a PM Perspective to Work 
Elements of IFEF Framework 
In order to gain further insight into the data that was captured, our next step 
involved adding IDEF0 PMO process elements for “Work.” Additionally, we attempted to 
complete process category information for “Time/Other Constraints,” “Request for 
Information,” “PMO Resources” and “Decision.” Not every data element contained a 
specific “Work” process element. It was even more likely that each data element would 
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only contain a portion of the category information. However, the data aggregated together 
based on each work process element creates a more complete definition.  
First, we identified the PM would be the focus of the study and translated the DoDI 
5000.02 acquisition process to an IDEF0 framework. The model in Figure 5 represents the 
overview of our top-level node, A0 and the primary function of the PM. Furthermore, it 
illustrates how requirements and resources help PMs deliver capabilities.  
 
Figure 5. IDEF0 Model of Program Management Office Function 
(Node A0 – Overview) 
A more detailed breakdown of node A0 demonstrated that the acquisition process 
can be cyclical for a PM in terms of the functions themselves, but also linear in that the PM 
must go through each acquisition phase to get a positive acquisition decision from the 
Milestone Decision Authority. We chose an iterative approach in our A0 chart that 
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incorporated the activities in each acquisition phase. We chose this over the linear process 
of completing each phase as a function in A0, because functions are repeated in each phase. 
The program starts with the Milestone Decision (Node A3), PM Plans (Node A2), and 
Executes (Node A3). 
 
Figure 6. IDEF0 Model of PM Function (Node A0 – Detailed) 
After we established the IDEF0 framework, we mapped the 82 work elements to 
the appropriate corresponding nodes identified in the acquisition process. Some work 
elements are depicted as functions, while others were more closely related to outputs. Table 
3 shows the 931 instances of the aforementioned PM Work elements found in our source 
documents and how we mapped them to the corresponding node in our IDEF0 model. 
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In Table 2, work elements such as “Develop and execute LCSP” were only counted 
once in the metrics shown even though they were included in both planning (A2) and 
execution (A3) nodes. Each IDEF0 model we created is defined and explained in further 
detail in the following section. 
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II. ANALYSIS OF IDEF0 MODELS AND WORK ELEMENT 
DATA 
The completion of the first four steps of our methodology has resulted in a data set 
of specific PM work elements that were then aligned with our IDEF0 mapping of the Army 
Acquisition processes. Now we can analyze the resulting IDEF0 models for the composite 
nodes. Then we can look at the results of the work element data itself to see if it provides 
any insights or suggestions for future reforms.  
A. ANALYSIS OF IDEF0 MODELS AND OBSERVATIONS 
The base IDEF0 model in Figure 5 represents the overview of the primary function 
of the PM. The model in Figure 6 represents, based on review of the 5000.02, the iterative 
acquisition process wherein the PM plans, executes, and then requests a milestone decision 
for each phase of the program.  
It is important to note that Figures 5 and 6 do not have an exhaustive representation 
of the inputs, outputs, controls, and mechanisms for each of the primary functions, A1 - 
A3, because of the need to portray the critical inputs to the Plan Program function from 
this viewpoint of this level of the model. Models for each of the process functions, A1 - 
A3, will follow with more comprehensive breakdowns of the inputs, outputs, constraints, 
and mechanisms.  
1. Manage Total Life Cycle of Program (Node A0) 
Table 4 shows the IDEF0 parameters (Input, Control, Mechanism, Output) for each 
work function node within A0. 
  
20 
Table 4. IDEF0 Analysis of Node A0 Composite Functions 
 
 
2. Plan Program (Node A2) 
Node A2 is defined as the function to “Plan Program” and includes planning actions 
and documentation. Node A3 is execute program, the functions necessary to run a 
successful program. We’ve identified five key areas that mirror each other in planning and 
in execution. The planning and documentation functions will be in A2, and the execution 
and management functions will be in A3.  
Figure 7 shows our IDEF0 model for A2. We see the first three functions mirror 
the key acquisition sections: requirements (A2-1), resources (A2-2), and acquisition (A2-




Figure 7. IDEF0 Model of PM Function (Node A2) 
Table 5 shows the IDEF0 parameters (Inputs, Controls, Mechanisms, and Output) 
for each work function node within A1. 
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Table 5. IDEF0 Breakdown of Node A1 Composite Functions 
 
 
The function “Managing Resources,” which includes obtaining and managing 
personnel, is a significant function of the PM. This was mentioned 11 times in the AR and 
0 times in the DoDI 5000.02. Analysts were required for every function in this study, yet 
only 1% (11 / 931) of the work elements discussed managing and hiring personnel.  
Fifty-two percent (483 out of 931) of the work elements focused on Milestone 
Acquisition Documents, which are identified as outputs in A1-3 (planning document) and 
A2-3 (executing the plan).  
3. Execute Program (Node A3) 
The IDEF0 model for the “Execute Program” function mirrors the three key 
planning areas in A2. The figure was not depicted due to the large similarities with A2.  
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While only 5% (46 / 931) of the work elements discussed interaction with 
stakeholders, a negative recommendation can result in not receiving your milestone 
decision. Stakeholders often influence additional documentation through requiring specific 
documentation or waivers to secure their support on an acquisition decision. 
B. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS FOR WORK ELEMENTS DATA 
Our analysis identifies five key issues that make the PM role incredibly difficult to 
conduct successfully. These are 
1. Authority and Synchronization with Requirements Organization 
2. Authority and Synchronization with Contracting Organization 
3. Development and Retention of Personnel  
4. Stakeholder Influence and Implied Authority over Program Execution 
5. Excessive Documentation Requirements 
We will now look at each of these in more detail. The first three of these issues 
were identified by a significant lack of emphasis within the analyzed documents.  
1. Authority and Synchronization with Requirements Organization 
JCIDs includes only one reference specifically to the program office manager, “a. 
A CIP breach review is a collaborative assessment by a risk mitigation team comprised of 
program office, capability Sponsor, capability developer, Functional Capability Board 
(FCB) representatives, and other applicable stakeholders” (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2015, p. A-18). 
Furthermore, this reference is specific only to a Critical Intelligence Parameter 
(CIP) breach review. Among the other documents reviewed, only another 14 mentions are 
made that assign responsibility to the PM to advise the requirement validation authority. 
Surely, there are other opportunities for the PM to provide value to the requirement 
development process. 
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The DoD and Army instructions and regulations we investigated establish a clear 
division of responsibility between combat developers, those responsible for generating 
requirements, and materiel developers, those PMs responsible for life cycle management: 
developing, procuring, fielding, and sustaining the materiel solutions that are needed. 
Practice indicates that such a clear division is a false one.  
First, few requirements are completely new and the most current expertise often 
resides within the PM that has managed previous materiel solutions for the same or similar 
capability. This is acknowledged by multiple references such as DoDI 5000.02,  
b. In support of the validation of the Capability Development Document (or 
equivalent requirements document), the Program Manager will conduct a 
systems engineering trade-off analysis showing how cost varies as a 
function of system requirements (including Key Performance Parameters), 
major design parameters, and schedule. The results will be provided to the 
MDA and will identify major affordability drivers and show how the 
program meets affordability constraints. (Department of Defense, 2015, p. 
82) 
A better solution would be if the PM and capability developers worked together 
from the very beginning to ensure the best product for the Warfighter. However, the PM is 
often officially told that requirements development is not his responsibility, and therefore 
he should only develop solutions based on documented requirements. Such an attitude 
assumes that the combat developer has all the expertise to fully develop the requirement.  
Furthermore, the structural divide established by current regulation and instruction 
established Capability Development and Integration Divisions (CDIDs) as the single parent 
of every program. They “birth” the program alone and the PM is often perceived as the bad 
parent that is not taking good enough care. Each combat developer often conducts his own, 
entirely independent, market research with vendors going directly to leadership proposing 
solutions or via industry day events such as the Fort Benning Expo held September 12–14, 
2017. This is an important tool for the combat developer to gain or maintain expertise in 
their functional area. 
The JCIDS’ process does not direct the capability developer to conduct independent 
market research. It recommends working with the sponsor (PM) and Integrated Process 
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Teams (including the PM). Due to geographical and organizational separations, PMs may 
not be intimately involved as a partner, and combat developers become frustrated by the 
amazing “demonstrated” capabilities presented by Industry. Capability developers then 
perceive that the acquisition office is unwilling or unable to give them these capabilities, 
while not fully understanding the acquisition and contracting policies. 
Combat developers are not subject to the DAWIA certification process that helps 
to ensure that acquisition professionals are properly trained. Thus, an adversarial 
relationship is quickly established. They are also frustrated because they officially control 
only the requirement, yet they can have one of the most significant impacts on the 
budgeting process. In fact, because the Army's current budgeting process prioritizes 
programs with a documented requirement, their authority to develop requirements is also 
an authority to begin or delay the budget process for materiel solutions. 
The PM is in a tug-of-war, does not have the authority or “gas pedal,” but is 
perversely responsible to get “the bus to the final destination on time” (Shyu, 2015). This 
is often a billion-dollar game of chicken, where funds are aligned for the next phase of the 
program, but a requirement document may be preventing the program from achieving that 
milestone. Since the capability developer is not responsible to the MDA, there are no 
repercussions if they delay under the premise of getting the best capability to the 
Warfighter. Both the capability developer and PM would benefit by working more closely 
together so they can ultimately support the Warfighter. 
Industry approaches the acquisition process differently. Their acquisition triangle 
is still PM, financial managers, and capability developers, or in this case business 
developers and marketing teams. When there are decisions to be made, they all report to 
one person in charge, the chief executive officer (CEO). Success is measured based on how 
many customers purchase products/services and the profit achieved by the company from 
these sales. All members of a corporate team are inherently engaged and motivated to 
ensure team success because product success is truly life or death of the company. While 
in the DoD, the only person with a schedule to manage is the PM, and each part of the 
acquisition process have their own CEOs, aka flag officers, so no one person manages this 
process. 
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Combat developers can only write requirements and PMs can only execute what 
they are given. When PMs fail to get it right, they most often point to changing or 
impossible requirements. Something else is needed to provide the inherent motivation that 
exists in Industry. An approach would be to embed those doing the requirement 
development work within the PMO. This would be straightforward since PEOs are already 
closely aligned with specific Centers of Excellence. As the ultimate customer for materiel 
solutions, the Centers of Excellence would remain in control by approving (validating) 
only those requirements they desired and supporting funding only for those materiel 
solutions that meet a need. The greater control of the requirement development process, in 
turn, inherently motivates the PM to get it right from the beginning and removes any 
ambiguity regarding whose responsibility it is. The same basic team that generates the 
requirement can immediately begin execution with minimal misunderstanding or 
misinterpretation. PMs would greatly benefit from a more efficient process to make final 
decisions on requirements, regardless of whether it rests within the PM or functional 
community. This will prevent stalemates that happen on a regular basis. Keeping the 
authority to approve and fund program requirements external to the PM, provides the 
appropriate check and balance and motivation to get it right, but adds program schedule. If 
the PM is ultimately held responsible for the lack of, or for poor requirements, they should 
be given greater influence in the derivation of functional requirements to technical 
requirements. As long as there are two chains of command for requirements and the PM, 
there will continue to be a duality and stalemate that will delay programs. We recommend 
further research on a better method to ensure the Warfighter receives the right solutions, 
while ensuring PMs do not have another steering wheel on the bus. 
2. Authority and Synchronization with Contracting Organization 
Similar to requirement development, a PM does not have any authority in the area 
of contracting. Only contracting officers within contracting commands, who are 
“warranted,” may enter the Government into a contract. The contracting officers work 
within the Army contracting commands that are part of AMC and are distributed regionally 
across the country. The documents we reviewed have little to say about contracting with 
27 
only two references to the work element “develop and manage contract” and 12 references 
to “develop and execute Acquisition Plan (AP)” identified.  
This lack of focus on contracting is astounding, since PMs are highly dependent on 
work performed by Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance (SETA) contractors 
and Industry to accomplish most of the work developing and manufacturing materiel 
solutions. Perhaps this lack of mention in the documents we reviewed is explained by the 
extensive documentation for contracting in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and 
corresponding Defense (DFAR) and Army (AFAR) documents. However, a quick word 
check of these documents further reinforces our original finding with only 39 mentions of 
PM, and its synonyms in more than 2,000 pages of regulation (8 in FAR, 22 in DFAR, and 
9 in AFAR). 
The lack of emphasis on contracting within the regulations may reflect a more 
general attitude of contracting as an afterthought, and this is in spite of the criticality of 
contracts to accomplish the work of the PM. The Army Contracting Command (ACC) 
Program Acquisition Lead Time (PALT) baseline measurements for the recommended full 
and open competition of contracts over $50M is 600 days or greater and this measurement 
specifies that measurement only starts “when the acquisition planning documents are 
complete and the primary responsibility for further action rests with the contracting office” 
(Simpson, 2017, p. 2). While in execution these timelines may be shorter, decisions 
involving level of review and the timeline for that review can be arbitrary or based on the 
contracting review official’s personal preference. This lack of predictability can add 
additional uncertainty to program schedules and frustrate the relationship between the PM 
and the contracting organization.  
Army Contracting offices are guided by the FAR, DFAR and AFAR, and their work 
is driven primarily with compliance with these documents. Furthermore, the 
responsibilities identified in the documents we reviewed are also focused on compliance 
rather than results. Like the requirements development issue, an immediate solution to 
improve contracting is to more closely align the contracting officers and their supporting 
functions (particularly legal) within a PEO’s chain of command. If the PM is ultimately 
held responsible for poor contracts, they should be given greater influence on contract 
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direction. If there are two chains of command for contracting and PM, there will continue 
to be a duality and stalemate that will delay programs. We recommend further research on 
a better method to ensure the Warfighter receives the right solutions, while ensuring PMs 
do not have another steering wheel on the bus. 
3. Development and Retention of Personnel 
The current chief of staff of the Army, General Mark A. Milley, includes people in 
his top three priorities (Weisberger, 2015), yet there are only seven references out of 931 
(0.8%) associated with the work element “Obtain personnel resources” among the 
documents we researched. The first reference in AR 70–1 refers simply to “Develop and 
submit requirements for financial, manpower, matrix, and contractor support to the AAE 
through the respective PEO or DRPM” (Department of the Army, 2011, p. 8). The other 
AR 70–1 reference is specific to program restarts and directs the PM to work with 
USAASC to “document required program office staffing” (p. 33). The remaining seven 
references are all contained in AR 700–127 and are entirely focused on one specific 
position within Army Acquisition, that of Product Support Manager (PSM). Therefore, the 
Army’s body of acquisition regulations almost entirely ignore addressing a PM’s 
responsibility and/or authorities to obtain the necessary personnel resources.  
It does so at the same time that it micromanages one specific position, that of the 
PSM, to be allocated and filled before MS B, assigned by the PEO, and even to specify the 
requirement that PEOs and MATDEVs (PMs) are required to “ensure that PSMs continue 
their professional development to include program management, contracting, and business-
financial management Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act training” 
(Department of the Army, 2016, p. 13). Such detailed policy requirements around a specific 
acquisition position are clearly micromanaging. 
Similar to the previous contracting discussion, the issue that this absence of 
personnel focus establishes for the PM is one of negligence and afterthought. What 
responsibility and/or authority does a PM have to build and maintain a strong team? From 
the documentation we have reviewed, it would appear that it can be summed up in the 
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statement, “Tell us who you need, and live with what you get...and make sure you have a 
PSM.” This is incredibly cynical, but too often hits home as the reality of a PM’s world. 
DoD and Army personnel practices are extremely cumbersome and time consuming 
on the front end. One of our authors had the personal experiences of spending months 
working to post and then review resumes, interview, and make a hiring decision, only to 
be informed that the individual would not accept the position because the Army would not 
pay relocation costs. The Army would not pay these costs simply because the initial 
position description did not include mention of this possibility though funding resources 
were available.  
In a single, shortsighted policy decision, additional offices like CPAC were able to 
determine the composition and timelines. This is a clear example where, in practice, the 
PM does not have the necessary authority to manage his personnel as needed to 
successfully execute the miss. If the PM is ultimately held responsible for the program 
personnel, they should be given greater influence on the hiring process. This would add 
little risk to the Warfighter. As long as there are two chains of command for hiring 
personnel, there will continue to be a duality and stalemate that will delay programs, adding 
another steering wheel on the bus. 
4. Stakeholder Influence and Implied Authority over Program 
Execution 
Authority outside the acquisition chain of command exists most clearly in the areas 
of logistics and testing with the conflict being the authorities provided to the Army Materiel 
Command (AMC) and Army Evaluation Command (AEC) over program decisions. 
The logistics and test and evaluation organizations in the DoD have authority for 
their functional areas, while the PM has ultimate responsibility for all aspects of a program. 
Going back to the previous bus analogy, these stakeholders have two of the most sensitive 
brake pedals. The primary PM documents that these two stakeholders influence are the Life 
Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP) and the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). Across 
13 key acquisition documents reviewed there were 154 instances in which PMs were 
directly tasked to develop and manage the LCSP, and 70 instances directing the 
30 
development of the TEMP. While the primary stakeholders are involved in the 
development of these documents, it is ultimately the PM’s responsibility to ensure that each 
document captures all of the necessary information for a complete sustainment effort and 
test and evaluation plan, respectively. 
AR 70–1 gives AMC responsibility over sustainment funding, “d. Support PEOs 
and PMs by overseeing the USAMC life cycle management commands’ development and 
submission of sustainment funding requirements during the Army’s planning, 
programming, budgeting and execution system activities” (Department of the Army, 2011, 
p. 21). Unfortunately, the same responsibility is assigned to the CAPDEV and PM by AR 
700–127,  
8–14. Resource planning 
1. The CAPDEV and MATDEV will ensure that costs and resource 
requirements for IPS execution are planned, programmed, budgeted, 
funded, and monitored throughout the acquisition program life cycle. 
2. The CAPDEV and MATDEV will establish IPS program objectives that 
support the reduction of O&S cost. 
3. The CAPDEV and MATDEV will prepare, submit and defend IPS 
resource requirements through the programming, budgeting and 
execution system process. (Department of the Army, 2016, p. 31) 
PMs typically have input into AMC’s PPBE process but no authority to change 
AMC priorities and therefore sustainment funding allotments to individual programs are 
controlled by AMC. The PM may be responsible for the entire life cycle of a program, but 
money is power, and AMC can directly change the course of a program’s sustainment 
execution since it controls the purse strings. This AMC control of funding generates a clear 
duplication of authority and prevents the MDA and his PM from being in full control of a 
program’s total life cycle. Instead, sustainment funding for each program should be 
submitted into the Army’s PPBE process by the PM along with the rest of a program’s life 
cycle funding (RDTE and PROC), received by the responsible PM if allocated by the 
Army, and subsequently provided to the responsible LCMC. 
Another duplication of authority associated with AMC comes from AR 700–142, 
Type Classification, Materiel Release, Fielding and Transfer. This regulation directly 
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assigns Materiel Release authority to, “The appropriate AMC LCMCs or other supporting 
command” (Department of the Army, 2015, p. 7). PMs are not permitted to field a system 
to Soldiers until a materiel release is approved and therefore the MDA’s authority over his 
program is duplicated, and really usurped, as the MDA must obtain approval from his AMC 
counterpart.  
However, this requirement for materiel release does not come from DoDI 5000.02. 
In fact, it is counter to an MDA authority stated by DoDI 5000.02 as  
The MDA, in consultation with the supporting operational test organization, 
and with the concurrence of DOT&E for programs on DOT&E oversight, 
will determine: 
1. Whether the capability has been adequately reviewed, performs 
satisfactorily, is supportable, and is ready for production and deployment. 
2. When assessments of fielded capabilities are required. 
(c) The MDA decides whether to produce and, in coordination with the 
requester/user, deploy (field) the system. (Department of Defense, 2015, p. 
167) 
The Army’s Materiel Release process is established by AR 70–1 and is meant to 
independently verify that a system is safe, suitable and supportable prior to fielding. By 
assigning MR authority to AMC LCMCs, the Army duplicates responsibilities directly 
assigned to the PM by DoDI 5000.02.  
Additionally, DoDI 5000.02 states 
Prior to exposing people, equipment, or the environment to known system-
related ESOH hazards, the Program Manager will document that the 
associated risks have been accepted by the following acceptance authorities: 
the CAE for high risks, Program Executive Officer -level for serious risks, 
and the Program Manager for medium and low risks. The user 
representative, as defined in MIL-STD-882E, must be part of this process 
throughout the life cycle and will provide formal concurrence prior to all 
serious- and high-risk acceptance decisions. (Department of Defense, 2015, 
p. 100)  
There is no mention of an independent authority separate from the PM’s direct 
chain of command. Moreover, to document that safety compliance has been achieved, the 
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PM obtains a safety certification from the responsible safety office. This office is already 
independent from the PM chain of command and therefore the materiel release process 
generates additional duplication of authority as multiple parties within AMC each question 
and assess the safety of the system. 
The duplicate authority and inherent problem with the current materiel release 
process can be corrected by simply returning the approval authority to the MDA. 
Independent review would still be achieved by the Army MR process since the three 
primary inputs to the process would remain with AMC. These are the safety certification, 
the suitability certification, and the supportability certification that are provided by the 
responsible safety office, AEC and responsible LCMC, respectively. With this change, the 
MDA would be capable of making the decision to field a new system directly and in 
consultation with the system’s user, and as intended by DoDI 5000.02. 
Duplication of authority associated with testing is not as overt as with logistics. 
AEC does not plan, program, budget, or execute funding for specific programs as is the 
case with AMC, nor has AEC been assigned program decision making authority like what 
AMC has been assigned in the materiel release process. The MDA has clear authority to 
approve the program TEMP, and the test community’s evaluation of a program, even if it 
includes a negative opinion of the system’s performance, is simply input and not a program 
decision. Instead, the test community obtains authority over a program indirectly based on 
its responsibility to provide the independent assessment.  
In particular, the Director Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) is granted 
unlimited ability to impact programs by having complete discretion over selecting the 
programs it will oversee. Furthermore, DOT&E is granted authority over the test quantity 
of LRIP systems. Both of these authorities can significantly increase the cost and schedule 
of a program and can do so to such an extent that test agency decisions undermine a 
program. There is no existing check and balance to counter this DOT&E authority. 
Additionally, after the TEMP is approved the detailed test plans developed to support 
agreed upon testing often expand beyond the intended scope necessary to address the 
requirement and seek to test undocumented requirements.  
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There are multiple reasons for this, to include the Way We’ve Always Done It 
effect, overreaching test directors, test agencies looking for additional work, etc. Since 
acquisition programs exist to provide capability to the Warfighter as represented by a 
Requirement Developer, an obvious check on the test communities’ authority would be to 
require the user’s concurrence with the T&E position. Unfortunately, such a check is not 
included in current processes and policy documents fail to include the user in several key 
areas of the test process.   
In addition, these Army Regulations are sponsored by the organizations that 
directly dictate what a PM needs to complete for them. This is, arguably, outside their 
authority. If the PM is ultimately held responsible for the program, we should limit 
regulations that add work but provide limited value to the Warfighter. As long as there 
continues to be multiple chains of command, there will continue to be a multiplicity or 
stalemate that will delay programs. We recommend further research on a better method to 
ensure the Warfighter receives the right solutions, while ensuring PMs do not have to deal 
with additional steering wheels on the bus. 
5. Excessive Documentation Requirements 
Our document analysis also identifies a significant emphasis on compliance to 
specific and voluminous documentation requirements. Despite attempts at reform, a 
common PM complaint continues to be that there is too much documentation. From a pure, 
process perspective as identified by the overall IDEF0, it would seem that the underlying 
process framework is reasonable. This means that PMs may be responsible for a significant 
amount of program cost increase, delay and performance failure simply due to poor 
planning and execution of the acquisition processes. 
Throughout our analysis, the idea that the PM should generate additional 
documentation to facilitate program movement through the stakeholder review process was 
a common theme. We found in our review that 52% of the work elements identified (483 / 
931) were where PMs were directly tasked with developing documentation to support 
Milestone Decision Reviews. Instead of the subject matter experts that reside within each 
stakeholder’s organization conducting an analysis of readily available program data, the 
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PM must instead produce and staff documentation that addresses all possible stakeholder 
concerns. These concerns must be formally addressed, regardless of how obvious their lack 
of applicability may be. The result is hours spent developing documentation that provides 
no benefit to the PM, the stakeholder, or the Milestone Decision Authority (GAO, 2015).  
The time required to accomplish this is further increased by the levels of review 
required within the stakeholder’s own organization (GAO, 2015). Inflated timelines are not 
a problem that is perpetuated exclusively by the stakeholders themselves, but also by the 
Milestone Decision Authority. The MDAs, or more specifically their staffs, base their 
review of the PM’s staffing packages on standard checklists that are rarely tailored to fit a 
particular program. The desire to address every existing requirement instead of the 
requirements that can be associated logically with each program leads to unnecessary 
document development and staffing, along with excessive stakeholder coordination.  
If the MDA’s role is to ensure that a program is ready to enter the next phase of the 
acquisition life cycle, then why shouldn’t the documentation, provided in the form of 
milestone packages, be tailored to address the specific concerns of the MDA? Throughout 
the DoDI 5000.02, the MDA is empowered to make tailoring decisions on the future of an 
Army program, and determine the most efficient way to address their own concerns. 
However, in execution, these tailoring efforts are hampered by inflexible organizations and 
bureaucracy. This change to regulation is a step in the right direction, but there is no forcing 
function or organizational incentive for implementation.  
The current balance between risk reduction and program efficiency leans 
predominantly toward risk reduction. PM offices, although directed by regulation to 
streamline, are not empowered to tailor their programs to achieve efficiency. The tailoring 
allowed to date has often taken the form of allowing the PM to apply for waivers from 
individual stakeholders. These waivers themselves require development and staffing time 
and are more often than not rejected by the stakeholder (GAO, 2015). Our IDEF0 model 
also identifies where stakeholders have a key input into the MDA’s decision and have 
signature authority on acquisition documents. This has been documented in Army 
regulations, for better or for worse, adding additional steering wheels to the PM’s bus.  
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In the end, the PM is held responsible for delays due to changes or additions driven 
by input from individual stakeholders, while those stakeholders face no consequences for 
delaying program progress (GAO, 2015). As the U.S. military struggles to maintain 
capability overmatch among near peer potential rivals, these inefficient processes make 
achieving that goal more difficult over time. 
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS, FUTURE WORK,  
AND CONCLUSION 
Our data collection and subsequent IDEF0 analysis revealed five key issues with 
the acquisition process as documented in current DoD and Army regulations: 
1. Authority and Synchronization with Requirements Organization 
2. Authority and Synchronization with Contracting Organization 
3. Development and Retention of Personnel  
4. Stakeholder Influence and Implied Authority over Program Execution 
5. Excessive Documentation Requirements 
DoDI 5000.02 and many Army regulations state that the PM is responsible for the 
full life cycle of their program. However, what all five of these issues have in common is 
that they result from the reality that the PM does not have the authority necessary to fulfill 
this significant responsibility. Furthermore, even the PM’s direct chain of command cannot 
fully provide this authority since current regulations spread the authority across numerous 
stakeholders and in some cases, even duplicate it across multiple chains of command—
TRADOC for requirements, AMC for contracting and logistics, and Installation 
Management Command for Personnel. Even the finding of excessive documentation 
requirements results from this same source. While the latest DoDI 5000.02 emphasizes the 
need for MDAs and their PMs to tailor and streamline the acquisition process, the current 
distribution of authority requires buy in from too many stakeholders resulting in a 
collection by the PM of “waivers” that result in the status quo and lengthy documentation 
process being the easier path to follow.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Along with responsibility for the entire life cycle of a PM’s program, the PM must 
be given greater and clearer authority. This can only be accomplished through a significant 
reorganization of the current Army acquisition structure and an emphasis on focused 
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stakeholder responsibility and accountability. Fortunately, the current Army leadership has 
recently begun setting the necessary conditions for exactly this sort of reform.  
The Army began this process in October 2017 by issuing a memorandum 
establishing six modernization priorities and acknowledging that current structures and 
processes need to be substantially improved. This memo was followed by three additional 
memorandums that provided progressively greater implementation details, particularly for 
the Cross-Functional Teams (CFTs) that will be used as the means to achieve the 
modernization goals more effectively. Key to this implementation is a phrase from the first 
memo, “To implement the necessary changes, our Army will establish unity of command 
and unity of effort that consolidates the modernization process under one roof” (Milley and 
McCarthy, 2017, para. 13). Army leadership has also begun holding stakeholders to the 
acquisition process accountable through the issuance of seven directives encompassing 
eight specific initiatives. We are encouraged that many of these seek to address the issues 
we have identified including: 
Initiative 1: STREAMLINING THE DEVELOPMENT AND APPROVAL OF 
CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
Initiative 2: IMPROVING TALENT MANAGEMENT 
Initiative 4: STREAMLINING TEST AND EVALUATION AND MINIMIZING 
REDUNDANT TESTING 
Initiative 6: STREAMLINING THE CONTRACTING PROCESS 
Initiative 8: ASSESSING PERFORMANCE WITH METRICS 
Our five key issues correlate fairly well with the initiatives listed above. Issue #1: 
Authority and Synchronization with Requirements Organization correlates with Initiative 
#1. Issue #2 Authority and Synchronization with Contracting Organization correlates with 
Initiative #4. Issue #3 Development and Retention of Personnel correlates with Initiative 
#2. Issue #4 Stakeholder Influence and Implied Authority over Program Execution 
correlates to Initiative #4 and #8. And Issue #5 Excessive Documentation Requirements 
was not discussed in this memo, but the 2015 GAO report discusses it thoroughly. 
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The issues we have identified are all likely to be resolved if Army leadership 
continues its aggressive reform of Army acquisition and follows through on the 
commitment to provide the Army acquisition process with unity of command. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
We recommend the following possible studies to delve deeper into how Army PMs 
can better accomplish their task of bringing materiel solutions to the Warfighter. 
1. A study to recommend streamlining the DoDI 5000.02 with a focus on  
fielding systems to the Warfighter versus the current focus which is to 
develop milestone documents (68%, 160 of the 234 work functions in 
DoDI 5000.02). 
2. A study to recommend rewrites of existing Army regulation to support 
fielding systems to the Warfighter versus direction from stakeholders to 
meet certain objectives for stakeholders that may or may not support the 
Warfighter. 
3. A study to analyze emerging acquisition reforms: Future Modernization 
Command (FMC) and Cross Functional Teams (CFTs) guidance. 
4. A study to determine specific industry program management and 
stakeholder roles and responsibilities. This would differ than previous 
studies that usually add additional regulations that add responsibilities and 
work but add limited value to the Warfighter. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of our 13 key documents identified many areas where the PM is 
required to request permission from stakeholders, through waivers or signatures on key 
documents, in order to move the program forward. Stakeholders may also sponsor 
additional regulations on an annual basis. In addition, our IDEF0 models identify that 
stakeholders have significant ability to influence the acquisition process. In the case of our 
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CEO counterparts in industry, there is one person in charge that can fully direct their 
programs. In the Army, we have multiple stakeholders fighting for control of the bus. 
We recommend the MDA have full control of the programs and have much stronger 
ability to guide the program. It may add risk to the Warfighter, but ultimately, it should 
streamline and save the government billions of dollars. As long as there are multiple chains 
of command for simple disagreements, there will continue to be stalemates that will delay 
programs. If we continue with our current method, we will have more stakeholders and 
more steering wheels to add to the bus. 
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APPENDIX B. DEFINITIONS FOR KEY TERMS 
Acquisition Manager  




No definition provided in the Financial Management Regulation, which is the only 
document to use the term out of the documents analyzed by this joint applied project. 
 
Materiel Developer (MATDEV) 
“The RDA command, agency, or office assigned responsibility for the system under 
development or being acquired. The term may be used generically to refer to the RDA 
community in the materiel acquisition process (counterpart to the generic use of 
CAPDEV)” (AR 70–1, 2017, p. 51). 
“The MATDEV is a PM or other responsible person that works for the development 
and acquisition command or agency for the system under development or being acquired” 
(AR 73–1, 2016, p. 66). 
“The research, development, and acquisition command, agency, or office assigned 
responsibility for the system under development or being acquired. This position can refer 
to the PEO, program or project manager, or others assigned to this function by the 
developing agency” (AR 73–1, 2016, p. 87). 
“The command, organization, or agency responsible for accomplishing life cycle 
management of a materiel solution to include research, development, production, fielding, 
sustainment, demilitarization, and disposal in response to approved CRDs” (AR 700–127, 
2016, p. 59). 
 
Materiel Development Organization 
No definition provided in the Army Regulation 702–19, 2015, which is the only 
document to use the term out of the documents analyzed by this joint applied project. 
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Program Manager (PM), Product Manager (PdM), Project Manager (PM) 
“An HQDA CSL manager for a system or program. A PM may be subordinate to 
the AAE, PEO, or DRPM. Refers to the management level of intensity the Army assigns 
to a particular weapon system or IS. As a general rule, a program manager is a GO or SES 
member; a project manager is an O–6, a GS–15, or the broadband or pay band equivalent; 
a product manager is an O–5, a GS–14, or the broadband or pay band equivalent” (AR 70–
1, 2017, p.52). 
 
Program, Project or Product Management Office (PMO) 
No formal definition is provided in any of the documents analyzed by this joint 
applied project. Army Regulation 70–1, p. 45 list of acronyms may be taken to imply that 
“PMO” may be taken to mean the office of any program, project or product manager. 
 
Resource Sponsor 
No definition is provided in the Department of Defense Manual for the Operation 
of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), 2015, which is the 
only document to use the term out of the documents analyzed in this joint applied project. 
The two uses of the term both closely associate it with PMs as in “(3) PMs/Resource 
Sponsors should coordinate with the Joint Staff J6 for approval of their intent to use the 
PIIT in a capability requirement document or ISP” (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2015, p.D-E-8).  
 
Solution Sponsor 
The Department of Defense Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS), 2015 does not provide a formal definition, 
but instead refers (p.GL-8) to the definition for document sponsor. 
Document Sponsor – The organization submitting a capability requirement 
document. Solution Sponsors for successor documents – Capability 
Development Documents (CDDs), Capability Production Documents 
(CPDs), and Joint DOTmLPF-P Change Recommendations (Joint DCRs) - 
may be different than the Requirement Sponsors for initial documents – 
Initial Capabilities Documents (ICDs), Urgent Operational Needs (UONs), 
Joint UONs (JUONs), and Joint Emergent Operational Needs (JEONs). 
Different Sponsors for requirements and solutions can occur when the initial 
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document Sponsor does not have acquisition authority and a different 
organization is designated to develop and field a capability solution, or 
when one Sponsor elects to leverage a previously validated document 
generated by a different Sponsor. (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2015, p. GL-6) 
A conflicting definition is presented by the JCIDS Manual “(b) Recommended 
Solution Sponsor. This is the DoD component proposed to be responsible for funding, 
developing, and fielding the capability solution, in support of the Requirement Sponsor” 
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